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HELL AND VAGUENESS
Theodore Sider

A certain traditional conception of the afterlife is binary. After death one
proceeds either to heaven or hell. Heaven is very, very good; hell is very,
very bad. There are no possibilities for the afterlife other than heaven and
hell, and membership in heaven or hell is never indeterminate or a matter
of degree. The problem with the binary conception is that it contradicts
God's justice. God must employ some criterion to decide who goes to heaven and who goes to hell. No reasonable criterion would be sharp; any reasonable criterion will have borderline cases. But the binary conception of
the afterlife allows for no corresponding fuzziness in how the dead are to be
treated. Hell must therefore contain people who are nearly indiscernible in
relevant respects from people in Heaven. No just Cod would allow such a
monstrously unfair thing.

A certain conception of Hell is inconsistent with God's traditional attributes, or so I will argue. My argument is novel in focusing on considerations
involving vagueness.
The target doctrine of Hell is part of a "binary" conception of the afterlife, by which I mean one with the properties of dicizotomy, badness, nOll-universality, and divine control. Dichotomy: there are exactly two states in the
afterlife, Heaven and Hell. After death each person will come to be, determinately, in exactly one of these states. (The doctrine of Purgatory does
not violate dichotomy provided everyone in Purgatory eventually ends up
in Heaven.) My argument does not apply to a continuous conception of
the afterlife, which to my mind is more defensible than the usual binary
doctrine. Badness: Hell is very, very bad. Or at least, Hell is much worse
than Heaven; for most of the argument this weaker premise will suffice.
More carefully, the premise is that everyone in Heaven is much, much better off than everyone in Hell. Non-universality: some people go to Heaven,
and some people go to Hell. I have no objection to Universalists, according
to whom everyone goes to Heaven. Nor does my argument apply to those
who uphold universal damnation. Divine control: God is in control of the
institution of divine judgment, in control of the mechanism or criterion that
determines who goes to Heaven and who goes to Hell. This is not to say
that God is solely responsible for the fate of created beings, for the divinely
mandated criterion might contain a role for free choices. Nor is it to say
that God is vindictive. The requirement makes no assumptions about the
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nature of the criterion, beyond that it is in God's control.
The argument proceeds as follows. Given dichotomy, the only possibilities in the afterlife are determinate membership in either Heaven or Hell;
given badness, the second is far worse the first; and given non-universality,
each is populated. Divine control requires that God be in control of the criterion determining these populations, and thus that God's choice of a criterion be consistent with his attributes. The criterion of judgment must
therefore cohere with his perfect justice. This much is straightforward; the
remainder of the paper will be devoted to filling in the rest. Here is a
sketch: any just criterion must judge created beings according to a standard
that comes in degrees, or admits of borderline cases; but no such criterion
can remain simultaneously just - or at least non-arbitrary - and consistent with the nature of the afterlife just described.
First, however, I should set aside the Calvinist doctrine of the elect, just
as I have set aside Universalism. But I set aside Calvinism in a different
sense, for unlike Universalism, the conclusion of my argument is inconsistent with Calvinism. I set it aside for dialectical reasons, for my argument
fairly directly begs the question against Calvinism. I assume throughout
that God's justice is not utterly divorced from our human notion of justice,
and r will assume that any human notion of justice precludes the criterion
of selection being pre-natal divine decree. Calvinists will disagree, and I
have nothing further to say against their position.
What might the criterion for the afterlife look like? Any just criterion of
selection, whether for the afterlife or pay raises in the workplace, must
make its selection depending on certain factors. Moreover, justice requires
its judgments to be proportional to the factors. If Sal1y's performance is
better than Jimmy's then, other things being equal, it would of course be
unjust to pay Jimmy more; but if Sally's performance is only minutely better than Jimmy's, it would be unjust to pay Sally far more. Of course,
human criteria usually fall short of complete justice. College admissions
offices must sometimes make arbitrary decisions (lithe cutoff must fall
somewhere"), for admissions officers lack complete information and colleges have a limited number of available slots. But God is omniscient, and
the holding capacities of Heaven and Hell are presumably boundless.
What J am calling the proportionality of justice prohibits very unequal
treatment of persons who are very similar in relevant respects. Whatever
one thinks generally about the nature of justice, its proportionality should
be acknowledged.
Given the proportionality of justice and the binary conception of the
afterlife, it can be argued that the divine criterion cannot be based on a
moral matter of degree. By this I mean some factor that comes in degrees,
and whose significance in the divine judgment is proportional to its presence. Suppose, for example, that the divine criterion is based on how
many obscenities one utters (the more the worse). Suppose further that
there are no gaps" in realized obscenity levels, in that for no n is it the case
that someone utters n obscenities, someone utters some greater number of
obscenities, but no one utters n+ 1 obscenities. (This assumption is
arguably harmless, for we may focus our attention on some possible world
in which it holds. More on this below.) Now choose some arbitrary
II
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damned person, who on Earth uttered some number n of obscenities, and
begin going through the afterlife, finding persons who were less and less
obscene. Initially these persons will all be in Hell, but eventually we will
arrive at one in Heaven. In fact, there must be a sharp cutoff in this procedure: some particular N such that someone with N obscenities is in Hell,
and someone with N-l obscenities is in Heaven. This is a necessary consequence of i) the lack of gaps in realized obscenity levels, ii) the binary conception of the afterlife, and iii) the current assumption that obscenity is a
moral matter of degree that is the sole criterion of divine judgment. But
such a cutoff would be monstrous, for it would blatantly violate the proportional nature of justice. If obscenity really were the sole criterion of the
afterlife, and its divine significance really were proportional to the amount
of obscenity present, no just God could give radically different treatment to
a pair of persons who differed only by a single obscenity.
No one would seriously propose obscenity as the divine criterion, but
the argument generalizes to apply to more realistic proposals. Choose any
moral matter of degree you like: number of charitable donations made,
number of hungry fed, naked clothed or feet washed, number of random
acts of kindness performed, or even some amalgam of several factors.
Given a binary afterlife, there will be someone who just barely made it and
someone else who just barely missed out. This is impossible, given the
proportionality of justice.
My opponent may grant the argument to this point, but yet be
unmoved. "Your argument is misplaced, for you have focused on works
to the exclusion of faith. Many think that salvation is given as a gift, not
earned by accumulating marks on a chit sheet. One can accept this gift by
believing in Jesus, by asking forgiveness for one's sins, and committing one's
life to Christ. Thus the argument does not apply, for believing, asking, and
committing are not matters of degree, nor are they' good works' by which
one accumulates merit and deserves to go to heaven."
Whether faith is a "good work" on the basis of which persons deserve to
go to heaven is irrelevant since my argument does not assume that persons
"earn" their salvation. It only assumes that God's criterion, C, for determining status in the afterlife must not violate proportional justice, i.e., that
God must not treat extremely C-similar persons extremely differently. 'The
important part of the objection is the claim that the proposed criterion,
faith, would not be a matter of degree, since believing, asking, and committing are not matters of degree.
This last claim is not clearly correct. Much current thinking about rationality and mind has it that belief is indeed a matter of degree. There is a
continuum of degrees of belief, or subjective probabilities, one can have in
a proposition, and there is no distinguished subjective probability marking
the propositions believed from the rest. Other propositional attitudes come
in degrees as well. It may be objected that the kind of "belief' required for
salvation is some state other than the ordinary propositional attitudes;
however, the reasons for taking belief to come in degrees will presumably
apply to this other state as well.
But no matter. Let us grant the objector that her proposed psychological
state', call it faith, does not come in degrees. This still cannot form the basis
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of a just divine criterion. The problem is that faith, like all psychological
states, has borderline cases. We are all familiar with this. There are clear
cases of insincere statements of faith, for example those of politicians who
proclaim religion on the campaign trail but leave it behind thereafter. And
there are clear cases of sincere faith. But what of the endlessly relapsing
drunkard, who genuinely repents each Sunday only to backslide again on
Monday? What of the television evangelist who begins with good intentions but is eventually corrupted by the temptations of power? If you reject
any connection between faith and lifestyle, simply vary the example.
Perhaps you think the faithful are those who make, at some moment in
their lives, some confession of faith. But what of the person who confesses
at age 10, when it is unclear whether he knows what he is doing, and who
subsequently leads a faithless life? Or a mostly faithless life? Or one who
confesses at age 9? 8? If on the other hand you deny that any single confession is critical, consider someone who has a series of borderline sincere
moments (or days, or weeks, or ... ) of apparent faith, but who is otherwise
faithless. Or someone on her way to becoming faithful but not determinately faithful yet, who is struck by a bolt of lightening while in this indeterminate state. Borderline cases might arise in yet another way. Many theologies contain exceptions for those who, through no fault of their own, never
heard the Gospel, and consequently lack faith. But surely the exceptions
will admit of borderline cases: those who heard the Gospel only once, or
only from corrupt missionaries, or only when very young... There is no
avoiding borderline cases for a faith-based criterion of divine judgment.
On the faith-based criterion the definitely faithless go to Hell, and the
definitely faithful to Heaven. But what of those who are not determinately
either? There is no sharp line to be drawn between the faithful and the
faithless, and yet a sharp line is demanded by a binary afterlife, for each
person must be sent determinately to either Heaven or Hell. The only possibility would seem to be to draw an arbitrary sharp line somewhere within the region of indeterminacy. But now consider two extremely similar
persons near the line, one on either side. (Assume, as before, that there are
no "gaps" in states of faithfulness.) One endures the torments of Hell, but
is only minutely, insignificantly different from the other who stands in the
presence of the creator in Heaven. This again violates the proportional
nature of justice.
Might God avoid the problem by letting the criterion admit the borderline faithful as well as the definitely faithful? No, for this ignores higher
order vagueness. Just as there is no sharp line to be drawn between the
faithful and the faithless, there is no sharp line to be drawn between the
definitely faithless and the indeterminately faithful. An arbitrary choice
would still need to be made, and the criterion would then fail to be just.
The objectionable sharp cutoffs any such faith-based criterion must
make can be brought out in a different way. Many will believe that faith,
like any mental state, supervenes on the physical makeup of the brain. So
consider any of the faithful in Heaven, and consider the results of minute
perturbations of this supervenience basis in ways that pushes that person
closer to being faithless. Remove an electron here, disrupt a neuron there,
and eventually the person will be definitely faithless. In between there will
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be a very long string of mental states, M 1, ... Mil: Ml the state of someone
faithful, Mn the state of someone faithless, and a vast number of intermediate states in addition, each extremely similar to the immediately adjacent
states. Some, for example certain dualists, will object to the assumption
that the mental supervenes. But even the dualist is familiar with the depth
and complexity of the human soul, and should accept something like my
sequence M 1, ..., Mil' though it will not be based on variation of physical
realizations. Either way, the sequence may be constructed. Consider, then,
a possible world containing n persons, one in each of these mental states.
The first goes to Heaven, the last to Hell. Begin with the first and move
down the list, one by one. Since membership in Heaven and Hell is determinate, and everyone goes to exactly one, it follows that there must be a
first member of this sequence who goes to Hell. Goofus, who has mental
state Mi' goes to Hell, whereas Gallant, with mental state Mi- l' goes to
Heaven. But provided we choose n large enough, Goofus and Gallant will
be extremely similar. It is impossible to believe that a just God would treat
such a pair so differently.2
There is no slippery slope fallacy" being committed here, for it is built
into the binary conception of the afterlife that Heaven and Hell have no
borderline cases. Thus the argument succeeds where familiar sorites arguments (somehow!) fail. Begin with a heap, and begin removing grains of
sand. Surely there is no one grain whose removal destroys the heap, and
yet eventually (for example when there is only one grain left) there is no
heap. How can this be? I have no answer; but it surely turns, somehow,
on the fact that there are borderline cases of heaps.
Not everyone accepts this. There is a view about the nature of vagueness called epistemicism, which currently enjoys remarkable popularity,
according to which no meaningful predicate has borderline cases. 3 There
really is a single grain that destroys the heap, though we cannot know
which. Epistemicism challenges my argument's assumption of borderline
cases of faith. It might also be thought to rescue the binary conception of
the afterlife. The epistemicist's sharp boundaries may be hidden from us,
but God sees all. Thus God could use a faith-based criterion of salvation,
sending people to Heaven or Hell depending on where they fall with
respect to the humanly inaccessible but divinely known precise standard.
This response inherits the intrinsic implausibility of epistemicism, which
I take to be considerable. No one, not even God, could know the cutoff
point for having faith, for no such cutoff exists. But this point need not be
pressed, for even the epistemicist's sharp cutoffs would not provide a just
criterion. Consider again our sequence MI' ... , Mn of mental states. The
epistemicist postulates a sharp cutoff in the extension of 'faith': Mi-I is in
while Mi is out. Thus the epistemicist grants semantic significance to the
difference between Mi-I and Mi' It would be quite another thing to grant
important moral significance to this distinction. Nothing in epistemicism
implies that the proposed semantic cutoffs are due to unknown factors that
have special significance of any kind, whether ontological or moral. Nor
should it. There is no hidden ontological halo that a collection of grains of
sand suddenly loses when it ceases to be a heap. Nor do the epistemicist's
cutoffs correspond to moral halos. The epistemicist postulates a kind of
U
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semantic halo by distinguishing Mi from Mi-l' and it is a great mystery just
how this is to be secured" but however it is secured it surely is not by
granting ontological or moral significance to the cutoff. Thus, even if epistemicism is true, God could not justly send Gallant to Heaven and Goofus
to Hell. Granted, Gallant is faithful where Goofus is not; but in this case
this distinction is one without great moral significance. One cannot both
uphold epistemicism and continue to believe that differences in vague
predicates always retain the significance we previously took them to have. 5
Suppose a single hair falls out one morning in the shower. If epistemicism
is true, this loss may place me for the first time in the ranks of the bald; but
even so, were 1 to be informed of this fact, 1 would have no more reason to
lament that hair than the one lost the previous morning.
Delicate issues lurk. I say that the epistemicist's cutoffs for predicates
like 'faith' and 'bald' lack rational and moral significance; but for the epistemicist, terms expressing rational and moral significance have sharp cutoffs as well. Just as there is a sharp cutoff for 'bald', so there is a sharp cutoff for 'state of hairlessness for which I have reason to lament'. Perhaps the
epistemicist must admit the significance of the cutoffs after all! The question here is one of importance for epistemicists generally, not just those
defending Hell: does epistemicism entail implausible distinctions of moral
significance?
It is true that epistemicism implies a first state of hairlessness I have reason to lament. But this need not be objectionable (or at any rate, any more
objectionable than epistemicism itself). For it may yet be that this first lamentable state is not much more lamentable than adjacent states. That is, it
would be consistent for the epistemicist to deny the inference from 'state
Hi is not lamentable but state Hi+l is lamentable' to 'state Hi+l is much
more lamentable than state H(. This connection between the binary predicate 'lamentable' and the comparative predicate 'much more lamentable
than' can be denied. Likewise, the epistemicist may accept a precise cutoff
point for the predicate 'has merit for the afterlife' without admitting the
justice of treating Goofus and Gallant differently, for even if only Gallant
has merit for the afterlife, it does not follow that Gallant has much more
merit. Proportional justice still prohibits treating Goofus and Gallant drastically differently.
But now what of the predicate 'can be sent to Hell without violating
proportional justice, given who has been sent to Heaven'? I cannot consistently admit a precise cutoff in tlzis predicate. So has the epistemicist got an
answer to my argument after all? I think not. Even for the epistemicist,
not all predicates have precise cutoffs, for some predicates are meaningless.
Nonsense predicates, such as 'slithy tove' are an instance of this.
Meaninglessness might also result from under-specification. Suppose I
introduce the term 'small' by stipulating that integers below 17 are small
and integers above ]98 are not small. Rather than admitting that my usage
of 'small' has an unknown precise cutoff, the epistemicist may want to
deny that I have introduced a meaningful predicate. 6 A third source of
meaninglessness (or incoherence) would be over-specification: either internal incompatibility of stipulations, Of, more to the point, incompatibility of
the stipulations with epistemicism itself. Imagine giving an otherwise
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acceptable introduction of some predicate, but then adding a "meaning
postulate" to the effect that the predicate has no sharp cutoff. The epistemicist cannot admit that the term is both meaningful and obeys the stipulation. But this is just what is going on with the predicate 'can be sent to
Hell without violating proportional justice'. Given the binary afterlife, it is
built into the meaning of this term that it cannot have sharp cutoffs; epistemicists must presumably deny it is meaningfuF Thus, this epistemicist
objection to my argument cannot be sustained.
(One might worry that my argument could then no longer be offered by
an epistemicist, for the argument employs a term that is arguably meaningless: 'it would be (proportionally) just to do X'. But the argument may be
recast using the comparative term 'more-just-than'. Consider a judge who
would send Goofus to Hell and Gallant to Heaven. All the argument
needs is the plausible premise that God is more just than that.)
We have seen that faith cannot be a just criterion for a binary afterlife,
because of its vagueness. This generalizes. Any proposed criterion that
admits borderline cases will need to draw an arbitrary sharp line, which
leads to injustice. Neither can the divine criterion be based on factors that
come in degrees, as was argued earlier. But what else is left? There are no
other plausible factors that could be used in the divine criterion. Once
vague factors and factors that come in degrees are set aside, only precise
factors that do not come in degrees remain. But the only such factors of this
sort that come to mind are those that are derived, via arbitrary choices, from
other factors that come in degrees or have borderline cases. There is, for
example, the factor of uttering no more than 1,000,006 obscenities in one's
lifetime (and even that is imprecise given the vagueness in 'obscenity',
'utter', and so on). And there are "precisifications" of 'faith': precise properties whose extensions include the definitely faithful, but also some arbitrary subset of the indeterminately faithfu1. 8 Any criterion based on such
factors clearly suffers the same fate as those considered above, for it would
treat persons who are significantly similar in radically differently ways.
Precision could be attained if God were a perfectionist, allowing only
the perfectly good (or faithful, or whatever) into Heaven. It could perhaps
also be attained if God were completely indiscriminate, banning only the
perfectly depraved (if such a state exists). But assuming that, as a matter of
contingent fact, no one is either wholly good or wholly bad, this would
violate the assumption of non-universality: either universal salvation or
universal damnation would follow.
This completes my argument against the binary conception of the afterlife. Can the argument be resisted? My argument invokes two persons
that are extremely morally similar, one in Heaven, the other in Hell. But if
there are "gaps" in the distribution of morally relevant qualities, we cannot
be sure that there is any such pair of persons. I ruled this out by stipulating that we are to consider a possible world in which gaps are absent, but it
might be objected that God insures that there are no persons near the cutoff
point of the divine criterion. One then wonders what happens in the possible worlds in which gaps are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps
are metaphysically necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds
without gaps some component of the binary conception of hell would need
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to be abandoned. I am somewhat inclined to object that it would be unbecoming for God to use a criterion that would allow for possible cases of
injustice if applied in every possible world, even if those cases do not actually arise. But the more important objection to the assumption of gaps is
that it is manifestly false. Every morally or spiritually relevant factor we
encounter in our lives is quite clearly a smear. The reply claims that the
world has precise moral or spiritual joints, but as a matter of contingent
fact these simply do not exist.
A more powerful objection to my argument would challenge the assumption of the proportionality of justice. Consider the following parable:
For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out early in
the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard. He agreed to pay
them a denarius for the day and sent them into his vineyard. About
the third hour he went out and saw others standing in the marketplace doing nothing. He told them, "You also go and work in my
vineyard, and I will pay you whatever is right. So they went. He
went out again about the sixth hour and the ninth hour and did the
same thing. About the eleventh hour he went out and found still others standing around. He asked them, "Why have you been standing
here all day long doing nothing?" "Because no one has hired us,"
they answered. He said to them, "You also go and work in my vineyard." When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his
foreman, "Call the workers and pay them their wages, beginning
with the last ones hired and going on to the first." The workers who
were hired about the eleventh hour came and each received a denarius. So when those came who were hired first, they expected to
receive more. But each one of them also received a denarius. When
they received it, they began to grumble against the landowner.
"These men who were hired last worked only one hour," they said,
"and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of
the work and the heat of the day." But he answered one of them,
"Friend, I am not being unfair to you. Didn't you agree to work for a
denarius? Take your pay and go. I want to give the man who was
hired last the same as 1 gave you. Don't I have the right to do what I
want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am generous?" (Matthew 20: 1-15 (NIV)).
The parable seems most directly a reply to a challenge to Heaven rather
than Hell. If Heaven contains both the solidly faithful and those that "just
scraped by", cannot the solidly faithful complain that their reward should
be greater? Note the difference in form from my challenge. The workers
claim that it is unjust to reward equally those with very different merit,
whereas I claim that it is unjust to "reward" very differently those with
(nearly) equal merit. Nevertheless, the parable can be turned into a
defense of Hell. Its general moral seems to be this: so long as one violates
no "intrinsic" or "absolute" obligations, it is not unjust to be generous to
some but not all. Given this moral, one might go on to deny that justice is
"proportional" in the sense introduced above: it is not unjust to treat very
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similar people very differently, provided one respects all one's intrinsic or
absolute obligations.
This could be turned into a defense of Hell as follows. For simplicity,
imagine that the divine criterion is based on some linear factor F, and
imagine some degree D of F that in some intrinsic or absolute sense clearly
does /lot merit entry into Heaven: setting aside any comparisons with how
God treats others, it would be just for God to send someone with degree D
of F to Hell. (That there is some such degree is presupposed by this objection. One version of this would be to claim that we all deserve Hell, no
matter how virtuous or faithful we are, that God would be within his
rights sending us all to Hell.) God would violate no direct obligation if he
(somewhat arbitrarily) set the cutoff point at level D of F, or even lower.
To be sure, there will be persons just barely worse than D in Hell and persons just barely better than D in Heaven. Goofus in Hell would protest
that Gallant's earthly F-efforts were only slightly better than his, and yet
Gallant has been admitted into Heaven. God's reply: "Friend, I am not
being unfair to you. Don't you agree that your degree of F merits Hell? J
want to be generous to Gallant, and I choose not to be to you. Don't I have
the right to do what I want with my own creation?"
This" absolutist" conception of justice is supposed to be supported by the
claim that the landowner in the parable is not being unjust. In fact it is
unclear to me whether even that is true, whether the landowner is being
unjust, but set that aside. A more critical problem is that the imagined
words of God to Goofus are far worse than those of the landowner - the
two cases are not parallel. Human landowners have limited funds, and so
must limit their generosity. Moreover, we rarely hold humans to standards
of perfection, and hence might not criticize the landowner, who after all is
being more generous than ordinary morality demands. Thus, our reactions
to the landowner parable are an unreliable guide to perfect justice.
There is a further asymmetry between the cases. Perhaps it is not unjust
to be arbitrarily generous when this involves bestowing some benefit on an
otherwise happy person; it is harder to admit the justice of arbitrarily rescuing some from horrible agony while abandoning relevantly similar others to their fate. This final asymmetry depends on Hell being very bad,
rather than being merely much worse than Heaven. That would be rejected by some thinkers, for example C. S. Lewis in The Great Divorce, who conceives of Hell as separation from God rather than torment. 9 But even if
Hell is not so bad, if it is much worse than Heaven God would be whimsically generous in granting the gift of Heaven to Gallant but not Goofus. I
say that whimsical generosity is unjust; or, more cautiously, that it falls
short of God's perfect justice. Some may disagree. But even they face a
hard question. Set aside justice: would God be whimsically generous? My
guess is that most Christians would reject the idea that God would behave
in such a seemingly arbitrary fashion.
ll1ere can be no such place as Hell, under its usual conception as part of
a binary afterlife, for there is no criterion for judgment that God could
employ. The continuity of morally significant factors is flatly in contradiction with God's justice (or at least God's non-arbitrariness) and a binary
afterlife. Christians should either reject the notion of divine judgment alto-
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gether, or claim that in the afterlife, as in life, there is no black and white,
only shades of grey.'0

Syracuse University
NOTES
1. It might be objected that faith is a relationship between a person and
God, not a mental state of the person taken in isolation. But God only enters
into that relationship with some. Unless God is arbitrary (and hence W1just),
there must be some feature of the faithful human in virtue of which God enters
into this relation. We can distinguish "thin faith", which is just this feature,
from "thick faith", which is this feature plus God's contribution to the relationship. By 'faith' I intend thin faith.
For an interesting discussion of the nature of faith, see William Alston,
"Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith", in Jeff Jordan and Daniel HowardSnyder, eds., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1996). Among other things Alston argues that faith should be construed as involving "acceptance" rather than belief since the former but not the
latter is under one's voluntary control. Like belief, acceptance surely has
degrees or borderline cases.
2. This and other parts of the argument are similar to an argument for
temporal parts in my "Four-Dimensionalism", The Philosophical Review 106
(1997): 197-231. In assuming the existence of the series Ml' ... , Mn it is not
assumed that belief has a linear underlying basis, only that ffiere is some linear
way of proceeding (in small steps) from M1 to M .
3. See Roy Sorensen, Blindspots (OXford: Itlarendon Press, 1988) and
Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994).
4. See Williamson, Vagueness, §7.5.
5. Thus I "argue from below", in Mark Johnston's sense: I note the underlying nature of faith according to epistemicism, and argue for a deflationary
conclusion about its significance. (More carefully, I argue that the cutoff point
is not especially significant; J do not argue that faith has no significance at all.)
Mark Johnston objects to similar arguments from below in "Human Concerns
without Superlative Selves", in Jonathan Dancy, ed., Reading Parfit (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997). I reject any general prohibition of argument from below (not
that Johnston advocates such a prohibition). Our values should be open to criticism, and what better basis for criticism than exploration of the underlying
nature of their objects?
6. Some other responses to this sort of argument are discussed in
Williamson's "Imagination, Stipulation and Vagueness", in Enrique
Villanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues 8, Truth (Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1997).
7. Some might claim that even non-evaluative predicates, such as 'heap',
have the lack of sharp cutoffs built into their meaning, and thus epistemicism
has the untoward consequence that all such predicates are meaningless or incoherent. But whether there is any such thing built in to the meaning of 'heap' is
surely a matter for theory - epistemicists can reasonably deny that there is.
8. It should not be pretended that there is a linear arrangement of the borderline faithful. The notion of a precisification is that of the supervaluationists.
See Williamson's Vagueness, chapter 5.
9. New York: The Macmillan company, 1946. Lewis's conception of Hell
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potentially raises another challenge, to the inclusion of divine control as one of
the defining factors of the binary conception of the afterlife. It might be argued
that God does not control the criterion of selection, for we separate ourselves
from God. But taken at face value this would violate the principle of dichotomy as well, and would thus depart from the core of the binary conception of
the afterlife which is my target. If status in the afterlife is purely a function of
the degree to which one has separated oneself from God, then since there is a
continuum of states of separation, there would need to be a continuum of
states in the afterlife.
10. Thanks to Bill Alston, Keith DeRose, John Draeger, William Hasker,
Hud Hudson, Europa Malynicz, Ned Markosian, Trenton Merricks, Jeremy
Pierce, Ron Sider, Walter Soyka, Michael Stocker, Brian Weatherson, Dean
Zimmerman and referees for helpful comments.

